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Abstract
The popularization of smart mobile device and the rapid development of wireless communication
technology lead to the explosion of global mobile data traffic, which brings huge business oppor-
tunities for content providers. In this paper, we consider a novel business model of video websites
via Membership-Advertising Mode in wireless network, where the video websites provide three video
services for mobile users: VIP-Member service, Regular-Member service and Non-Member service.
The VIP-Member (Regular-Member) service provides the highest level (middle level) quality and non-
advertising video service with high (low) price, while the Non-Member service provides the lowest
level quality and advertising-containing video service for free. Meanwhile, the video websites sell their
advertising spaces to the advertiser to create extra revenues. We formulate the interactions among the
advertiser, video websites and mobile users as a three-stage Stackelberg game. Specifically, in Stage I,
the advertiser decides the advertising budget; in Stage II, the video websites determine their advertising
spaces selling strategies for advertiser and the membership pricing strategies for mobile users; in Stage
III, the mobile users make their own decisions on video watching strategies for each video website.
We analyze the equilibrium of each sub-game. Particularly, we derive the closed-form solutions of each
mobile user’s optimal video watching strategies, each video website’s optimal membership price and
the optimal advertising spaces selling number. In addition, we also investigate the piece-wise structure
of the advertiser’s utility function, and further propose an efficient algorithm to obtain the optimal
advertising budget. Finally, numerical results show the impacts of different parameters’ values on each
entity’s utility as well as the key indicators.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
With the spreading and application of smart mobile terminals, the global mobile data traffic
grows explosively [1]. According to the prediction of Cisco, the global mobile data traffic is
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2projected to achieve 49 exabytes/month by 2021, video streaming will occupy almost 78% of the
mobile traffic and the average mobile connection speed will exceed 20 Mbps [2]. Meanwhile,
the developments of recent communication technologies such as High-Density Network, Massive
MIMO, Millimeter-Wave Communication and Local Caching, etc [3]–[6] accommodate the
requirements of data traffic explosion and data rate increment.
Under this context, the content providers are providing more and more of their services on
the platform of the mobile device. Take video websites for example, in the past, we have to
watch live or recorded videos on PC by visiting video websites; nowadays, we can watch videos
through the APPs on smart mobile devices. Since the content providers (e.g., video websites)
are profit-oriented entities, their objectives are to maximize their own revenues in addition to
compensating for operational cost and the payment of video copyright. Therefore, a new business
model which is adapted to the mobile user-oriented network model is urgently needed for content
providers to create more revenues [7].
B. Motivations
Recently, a variety of works have applied several game-theoretic approaches to study the
business models of network resource allocation. The literature can be categorized into several
lines of works: 1) for cache resource allocation, references [8], [9] respectively applied the
Contract model and Stackelberg-game model to study the optimal pricing strategy of operators
and the optimal caching strategy of content providers in a small-cell system, and reference
[10] proposed the pricing and caching scheme in an information centric network. 2) For data
offloading, reference [11] utilized a distributed market framework to analyze the interactions
between the offloading service providers (access points) and the offloading consumers (data
traffic), reference [12] proposed a three-stage Stackelberg game model to formulate the data
offloading problem among mobile network operators and access point owners. References [13]–
[16] adopted different game approaches to investigate the physical parameters (e.g., power,
bandwidth, SINR and average achievable rate) allocation problems, where [13] studied the relay
nodes selection and power allocation problems in cooperative relay model by the Stackelberg
game approach, [14] analyzed the price-based power allocation strategies for two-tier spectrum-
sharing femtocell networks, [15] investigated the wireless service provider selection problem and
the corresponding bandwidth allocation problem in multi-tier heterogeneous cellular networks
by evolutionary game and multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game, respectively; and [16]
3modeled multiple small cells by stochastic geometry and utilized evolutionary game theory to
analyze the average SINR and the average achievable rate. In addition, some works have also
applied varieties of game theories to study the resource allocation problems in the fields of WIFI
& LTE-U [17]–[20], distributed computing [21], [22], cloud computing & softwarized network
[23], [24], and rollover data [25], [26], etc. Although the above literatures have not directly
considered the business model among content providers and mobile users, they have given us
great insights for the business modeling of new scenarios and the analysis of the interactions
among all the entities.
Consider the relationship among content providers and mobile users, and take video websites
for example, Membership mode is an effective business mode to create revenues [27]. More
specifically, Membership mode refers to an operational mode where the video website generates
revenue from the mobile users through selling access rights of video resources to mobile users.
In addition to membership mode, Advertising Mode, an emerging business mode, provides
another good solution for the content provider (e.g., video websites) monetization [28]–[32].
In this mode, the video websites can create revenues from the advertisers via embedding the
advertisements on their platforms in the form of text, picture or video. Meanwhile, the advertisers
can raise the brand awareness and further increase the sales of commodities via video advertising
on video website, which is beneficial to increase the advertisers’ revenue. Several works have
been conducted to study the field of advertising [33]–[40]. More specifically, references [33]–
[36] mainly focused on the study of the impact of targeting technology on advertising markets,
references [38], [39] analyzed the competitions among advertising companies in vehicular ad-
hoc networks, reference [37] investigated the advertising targeting and monetization problem
of mobile location-based user in a venue (e.g., shopping mall or airport), and [40] applied
advertising to study the monetization model of the monopoly wifi business market.
Combining the above two business modes together, we can build a new mode called
Membership-Advertising Mode. More specifically, the video website provides two types of ser-
vices for mobile users: member service(s) (one or more) and non-member service. The website
members need to pay the video website for enjoying the high quality, ad-free video services, while
the non-member can watch the low quality, ad-containing video services for free. In this mode,
the video website can create revenues from mobile user members as well as advertisers, and is
thus a more flexible business mode than membership mode or advertising Mode. In practice, some
popular video websites in China, such as TENCNET, IQIYI, YOUKU and SOHU, have adopted
4the Membership-Advertising Mode in their major business model. However, we notice that few
literature has studied the interactions among all interest entities of this model (e.g., advertiser,
video websites and mobile users) as well as the designs of the corresponding policies. Motivated
by this, we conduct the study in this paper.
C. Contributions
In this paper, we investigate the economics of the video websites with the Membership-
Advertising Mode in the wireless network. More specifically, video websites provide three
video services for mobile users: VIP-Member service, Regular-Member service and Non-Member
service. For VIP-Member and Regular-Member services, the video websites charge the subscribed
mobile users a fee according to their pricing mechanisms, where the price of the VIP-Member
service is higher than that of Regular-Member service. Correspondingly, VIP-Member service
subscribers can enjoy the high rate ad-free video service for unit period, and the Regular-Member
service subscribers can enjoy the middle rate ad-free video service for unit period. For Non-
Member services, although no membership fee is paid, the mobile users can only enjoy the
low rate ad-containing video service. According to the websites’ pricing mechanisms, mobile
users choose one of these three video services as their watching strategies based on their own
preference of the video Quality-of-Experience (QoE). Since the Non-Member mobile users are
the potential consumers of the advertiser, to promote the sales of its commodities, advertiser
offers a certain budget for purchasing the advertising spaces among all video websites to display
its commodities’ advertisements. Meanwhile, the advertising budget attracts each video website
to sell its own advertising spaces to the advertiser. Each video website decides the selling number
of the advertising spaces with the consideration of the advertising budget, its own advertising
space maintenance cost and other websites’ advertising spaces selling strategies.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• Novel Video Website’s Business Model: To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
that proposes and analyzes the network model consisting of multiple video websites, multiple
mobile users and an advertiser. In this network model, we propose a novel Membership-
Advertising Mode in the monetization model.
• Equilibrium Analysis: We model the interactions among advertiser, video websites and
mobile users as a three-stage Stackelberg game, and study the behaviour of each entity of
interest as well as the corresponding sub-game equilibrium systematically. In particular, we
5derive the unique closed-form solutions of each mobile user’s optimal watching strategies
and each video website’s optimal membership pricing strategy. We then determine the unique
optimal subset of those video websites participating in the advertising budget game by
exploiting the special structure of the advertisement (AD) space maintenance cost in the
subset, and further derive the closed-form of the unique optimal AD-spaces selling number
strategy for each website. Moreover, we analyze the piece-wise structure of the advertiser’s
utility and propose an efficient algorithm to obtain the optimal advertising budget.
• Analysis of Key Parameters’ impacts: We analyze the relationship among the preference
factor thresholds with different values of VIP-Member price coefficient, and further inves-
tigate the coefficient’s impact on mobile users’ optimal watching strategies. Meanwhile, we
also find that the subset of video websites that participate in the adverting budget game
only depends on the AD-space maintenance cost rather than the advertising budget.
• Performance Evaluation: Extensive simulation results show that: 1) the increasing of VIP-
Member price coefficient is not beneficial for both video websites and advertiser to create
revenues; 2) The impact of popularity concentration level on each utility is in connection
with the popularity of the subset of the video websites that participate in the advertising
budget game; 3) The utility of video website (advertiser) increases (decreases) in the AD-
space maintenance cost; 4) The utility of video website (advertiser) increases in visiting
frequency if the website’s AD-spaces are saturated, when visiting frequency is sufficiently
large, the utility of video website (advertiser) is independent of visiting frequency.
D. Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system model
and presents utility functions. Section III presents the three-stage stackelberg game to formulate
the interactions of the utility function maximization problem and provides the game equilibrium.
Section IV proposes the numerical computation to validate the results in this paper. Finally,
section V concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Before introducing the system model, we first list all the symbols in Table I for convenience
of reading.
6TABLE I
LIST OF SYMBOLS.
Parameters Description
K Video websites number.
N Mobile users number.
G Advertisements number.
QVk VIP Member service quality.
QRk Regular Member service quality.
QNk Non Member service quality.
θ ∈ [0, θmax] The preference for QoE .
σk(> 1) VIP Member price coefficient.
γ(> 0) Concentration level.
φk Video website k’s popularity.
ξ(> 0) Mobile user’s visiting frequency.
Variables Description
Ck(> 0) AD space maitenance cost.
pk Membership price.
Mk(Pa) AD space selling number.
Pa The advertising budget.
Functions Description
χVk (pk) VIP Member probability.
χRk (pk) Regular Member probability.
χNk (pk) Non Member probability.
s(θ,p) Mobile user’s watching strategy set.
τk(Pa, pk,Mk) AD Watching Probability.
V MUk (θ, sk, pk) Mobile user’s utility.
V Mk (pk) Video website’s membership utility.
V Ak (M , Pa) Video website’s advertising utility.
V VWk (M , pk, Pa) Video website’s total utility.
V AD(Pa,p,M) The utility of the advertiser.
In this paper, we consider a network ecosystem which consists of an advertiser, K video
websites and N mobile users, as show in Fig. 1. We focus on the interactions among them via
a three-stage Stackelberg game.
A. Network Model
1) Advertiser: The advertiser has total G advertisements (ADs) which seek to display on
K video websites. The advertiser has total Pa advertising budget to buy the advertisement (AD)
spaces from K video websites. Here, the unit AD-space refers to the time segment (e.g., 30
seconds) at the beginning of a video which is specially used for displaying video AD.
2) Video Website: There are total K video websites in the network, and we denote K ,
{1, 2, · · · , K} as the website set. There exists two-fold interactions for each video website:
one is the interaction between the video website and the advertiser: under the motivation of
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Fig. 1. System Model.
the advertising budget Pa, all video websites compete with each other through selling the AD
spaces Mk; the other is the interaction between the video website and the mobile users: each
video website k provides three video services for mobile users: VIP-Member service, Regular-
Member service and Non-Member service. We let QVk , Q
R
k and Q
N
k respectively denote the
corresponding video service quality of website k. More specifically, for the VIP-Member service,
the website k charges its subscribed mobile user σkpk (σk > 1), where σk is the VIP-Member
price coefficient, and provides the video service with video rate rVk per unit period (e.g., /month),
and the service quality is measured by QVk = ln(1+r
V
k ) [41]; for the Regular-Member service, the
website k charges its subscribed mobile user pk, and provides the non-advertising video service
with video rate rRk per unit period, and the service quality is measured by Q
R
k = ln(1 + r
R
k )
[41]; for the Non-Member service, although it is free of charge, the webwite only provides the
advertising-containing video service with video rate rNk , and the service quality is measured by
QNk = ln(1 + r
N
k ) [41]. Without loss of generality, we assume that r
V
k > r
R
k > r
N
k > 0, naturally,
we have QVk > Q
R
k > Q
N
k > 0.
3) Mobile User: We denote N as the total number of mobile users browsing the video
websites within an unit period. We let a positive θ denote each user’s preference for Quality-of-
Experience (QoE) for website browsing, and further assume θ follows the uniform distribution
over [0, θmax]. The preference factor θ reflects the user’s requirement and willingness for video
watching experience, namely, a larger θ implies that the user is sensitive to the video QoE, while
a lower θ means the user is relatively QoE-tolerant. Note that since different users may have
8different preference factor θ values, they have different watching strategies when browsing one
video website k, k ∈ K.
According to the video service types of each video website, we denote sk ∈ {1, 2, 3} as a
mobile user’s corresponding watching strategy when browsing video website k, and denote s ,
{s1, s2, · · · , sK} as the mobile user’s watching strategy set for all the K websites. Specifically,
sk = 1, sk = 2 and sk = 3 denote that an mobile user chooses to be an VIP-Member, Regular-
Member and Non-Member of website k, respectively.
B. Mobile User’s Utility
1) Mobile User’s Payoff: Based on mobile user’s three different watching strategies, for a
type-θ user browsing website k, the payoff over an unit period is defined as follows:
V MUk (θ, sk, pk) =

θQVk − σkpk, sk = 1;
θQRk − pk, sk = 2;
θQNk , sk = 3.
(1)
Each mobile user will choose one strategy which maximizes the payoff as the utility
function.
2) Strategy Probability, Visiting Frequency and Websites Preference: Given price pk, we
denote χVk (pk), χ
R
k (pk) and χ
N
k (pk) as the probability that a mobile user chooses to be VIP-
Member, Regular-Member and Non-Member, respectively. In addition, we assume that each
mobile user’s visiting frequency for each video website per unit period follows the Poisson
distribution with mean ξ(> 0). Meanwhile, due to different influence factors such as individual
willingness, QoS, charge standard, video content popularity and so on, mobile user has different
level of preference for all the K video website. We let φ , [φ1, φ1, · · · , φK ] denote each mobile
user’s preference of K video websites, where φk follows the Zipf distribution, i.e.,
φk =
1/kγ∑K
i=1
1
iγ
(2)
for k ∈ K. Note that this assumption is also made in [8], [9]. The parameter γ is a positive real
number which characterizes the concentration level of the website’s popularity distribution. A
larger γ implies that the polarization of popularity is more obvious, that is, the popularity of
those websites with smaller index k is much higher than others.
9C. Video Website’s Utility
Since each video website has the interactions with both mobile users and advertiser, its
utility comes from two aspects.
One is the utility comes from the mobile users’ payments for membership and we denote
it by V Mk (pk), k ∈ K:
V Mk (pk) = σkpkφkNχ
V
k (pk) + pkφkNχ
R
k (pk) (3)
Recall that N is the mobile user number, φk is the popularity of video website k, χVk (pk)
and χRk (pk) are respectively the VIP-Member probability and the Regular-Member probability of
website k under price pk, thus φkNχVk (pk) and φkNχ
R
k (pk) are respectively the expected number
of the VIP-Member and the Regular-Member of website k.
The other is utility comes from selling AD spaces to the advertiser. We assume the reward
that video website k receives is proportional to Mk, and denote Ck as the maintenance cost of
unit AD space, then, the utility of website k in terms of selling AD space can be expressed as
follows:
V Ak (Mk,M−k, Pa) =
Mk∑K
j=1Mj
Pa − CkMk, k ∈ K (4)
where M−k = {Mi|i ∈ K\k}.
To sum up, the utility of video website k, k ∈ K, V VWk (Mk,M−k, pk, Pa) is given by:
V VWk (Mk,M−k, pk, Pa) = V
M
k (pk) + V
A
k (Mk,M−k, Pa) (5)
D. Advertiser’s Utility
1) AD Watching Probability: We assume the total number of AD spaces that video website
k sells to the advertiser under advertising price Pa is Mk(Pa). Meanwhile, we assume that the
AD spaces allocation among all the ADs follow equal allocation principle. Since each website
needs to display total G ADs, the total display number of each AD over unit period is Mk(Pa)
G
.
In addition, the expected number of mobile users who watch the advertising-containing video
of website k is φkNχNk (pk). Since the average visiting frequency of each mobile user per unit
period is ξ, the total visiting number of the advertising-containing video of website k per unit
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period is ξφkNχNk (pk). Therefore, if a mobile user watches an advertising-containing video of
website k, the probability that the user can watch a specific advertisement is given by:
ϕk(Pa, pk,Mk) =
Mk(Pa)
GξφkNχNk (pk)
, k ∈ K. (6)
Note that each mobile user’s website visiting frequency is a random discrete variable X which
follows Poisson distribution with mean ξ, and its probability mass function (PMF) is given by
[42]:
P[X] = e−ξ
ξX
X!
, X = 0, 1, · · · ,∞. (7)
According to the complementary advertising assumption [33], [43], [44], we know that the
advertiser can receive the reward of an advertisement on video website k only if the specific
advertisement has been watched by the mobile user at least one time. We further define the
probability that a specific advertisement on video website k which has been watched at least
one time as AD Watching Probability, i.e., τk(Pa, pk,Mk), which is given by:
τk(Pa, pk,Mk) = 1−
∞∑
x=0
P[x](1− ϕk(Pa, pk,Mk))x = 1−
∞∑
x=0
e−ξ
ξx
x!
(
1− Mk(Pa)
GξφkNχNk (pk)
)x
= 1− e−ξ
 ∞∑
x=0
(
ξ − Mk(Pa)
GφkNχ
N
k (pk)
)x
x!
 (a)= 1− exp(− Mk(Pa)
GφkNχNk (pk)
)
(8)
where (a) is obtained by the Taylor expansion for exponential function ex =
∑∞
i=0
xi
i!
.
2) Advertiser’s Payoff: Based on the AD Watching Probability τk(Pa, pk,Mk), k ∈ K, the
payoff of the advertiser V AD(Pa,p,M ) is given by:
V AD(Pa,p,M ) =
K∑
k=1
ωkGφkNχ
N
k (pk)τk(Pa, pk,Mk)− Pa (9)
where ωk is the reward coefficient that the advertiser display ADs on website k, G is the total
ADs number, φkNχNk (pk) is the expected Non-Member number of website k, τk(Pa, pk,Mk) is
the AD Watching Probability, Pa is the advertising budget, p , {p1, p2, · · · , pK} is the set of
Regular-Member price and M , {M1,M2, · · · ,MK} is the set of selling number of AD spaces.
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III. THREE-STAGE STACKELBERG GAME
In this section, we will utilize a three-stage stackelberg game to formulate the interactions
among the advertiser, video websites and the mobile users. Specifically, in Stage I, the advertiser
decides its total advertising budget Pa; in Stage II, each video website k specifies the selling
number of AD spaces Mk and the Regular-Member price pk; in Stage III, each type-θ mobile
user chooses the video website watching strategies s. We use backward induction to analyze the
three-stage Stackelberg game.
A. Stage III: Mobile User’s Optimal Video Watching Strategy s∗
1) Preference Factor Threshold: For a specific video website k, the goal of each mobile
user is to choose one video watching strategy sk that maximizes its payoff in (1). Since the
Regular Member price pk in (1) is given in Stage II, each mobile user’s video watching strategy
s only depends on the preference factor θ ∈ [0, θmax]. Before we proceed, we first give some
definitions about the preference factor threshold.
Definition 1. We define θT12k as the preference factor threshold such that V MUk (θ, sk = 1, pk) =
V MUk (θ, sk = 2, pk), then, θ
T12
k , min{ (σk−1)pkQVk −QRk , θmax}.
Definition 2. We define θT13k as the preference factor threshold such that V MUk (θ, sk = 1, pk) =
V MUk (θ, sk = 3, pk), then, θ
T13
k , min{ σkpkQVk −QNk , θmax}.
Definition 3. We define θT23k as the preference factor threshold such that V MUk (θ, sk = 2, pk) =
V MUk (θ, sk = 3, pk), then, θ
T23
k , min{ pkQRk −QNk , θmax}.
Based on the preference factor threshold of video website k (∈ K), the optimal video
watching strategy of a type-θ mobile user is given by:
s∗k(θ, pk) =

1, if max{θT12k , θT13k } ≤ θ ≤ θmax;
2, if θT23k ≤ θ ≤ θT12k ;
3, if 0 ≤ θ ≤ min{θT23k , θT13k }.
(10)
2) The impact of σk on s∗k: Next, we will analyze the relationship among
(σk−1)pk
QVk −QRk
, σkpk
QVk −QNk
and pk
QRk −QNk
, and rigorously describe it in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For k ∈ K,
12
1. when 1 < σk ≤ σTk , Q
V
k −QNk
QRk −QNk
, then, (σk−1)pk
QVk −QRk
≤ σkpk
QVk −QNk
≤ pk
QRk −QNk
;
2. when σk > σTk ,
QVk −QNk
QRk −QNk
, then, (σk−1)pk
QVk −QRk
> σkpk
QVk −QNk
> pk
QRk −QNk
.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
Remark 1. Firstly, it is obvious that both (σk−1)pk
QVk −QRk
and σkpk
QVk −QNk
are the linear increasing function
of σk since both pkQVk −QRk
and pk
QVk −QNk
are two positive constants under price pk. Moreover, since
pk
QVk −QRk
> pk
QVk −QNk
> 0, the slope of straight line (σk−1)pk
QVk −QRk
, i.e., pk
QVk −QRk
, is larger than that
of straight line σkpk
QVk −QNk
, i.e., pk
QVk −QNk
; Secondly, pk
QRk −QNk
is a σk-independent positive constant;
Thirdly, since these three straight lines intersect at σk = σTk ,
QVk −QNk
QRk −QNk
, in the domain (1, σTk ], we
have (σk−1)pk
QVk −QRk
≤ σkpk
QVk −QNk
≤ pk
QRk −QNk
, and in the domain (σTk ,∞), we have (σk−1)pkQVk −QRk >
σkpk
QVk −QNk
>
pk
QRk −QNk
. Here, we present the graphical visualization of the relationship among (σk−1)pk
QVk −QRk
, σkpk
QVk −QNk
and pk
QRk −QNk
stated in Lemma 1 in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. Graphical Visualization of Lemma 1.
When taking θmax into consideration, there are total five possibilities of the optimal video
watching strategy s∗k to discuss.
Case 1–σk ∈ (1, σTk ]: Combining Definition 1-3 and Lemma 1, it is not difficult to find out
that the inequality θT12k ≤ θT13k ≤ θT23k holds for any positive θmax1. Therefore, the optimal video
1According to Definition 1-3, when θmax ∈ [0, θT12k ], we have θT12k = θT13k = θT23k = θmax; when θmax ∈ (θT12k , θT13k ], we
have θT12k =
(σk−1)pk
QV
k
−QR
k
, θT13k = θ
T23
k = θmax, thus θ
T12
k ≤ θT13k = θT23k ; when θmax ∈ (θT13k , θT23k ], we have θT12k = (σk−1)pkQV
k
−QR
k
,
θT13k =
σkpk
QV
k
−QN
k
, θT13k = θmax, thus θ
T12
k ≤ θT13k ≤ θT23k ; when θmax ∈ (θT23k ,∞), we have θT12k = (σk−1)pkQV
k
−QR
k
≤ θT13k =
σkpk
QV
k
−QN
k
≤ θT23k = pkQR
k
−QN
k
.
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watching strategy of a type-θ mobile user in (10) can be reduced to:
s∗k(θ, pk) =
 1, if θT13k ≤ θ ≤ θmax;3, if 0 ≤ θ ≤ θT13k . k ∈ K. (11)
Case 2–σk ∈ (σTk ,∞): Similar to the analysis of the footnote in case 1, the inequality
θT12k ≥ θT13k ≥ θT23k holds for any positive θmax. Therefore, the corresponding optimal video
watching strategy in (10) can be further reduced to:
s∗k(θ, pk) =

1, if θT12k ≤ θ ≤ θmax;
2, if θT23k ≤ θ ≤ θT12k ;
3, if 0 ≤ θ ≤ θT23k .
k ∈ K. (12)
In addition, The graphical illustration of all the five possibilities of the optimal video watching
strategy s∗k stated in (11) and (12) is presented in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. Graphical illustration of all the optimal video watching strategies. (a) and (b) show the two optimal strategies in the domain
σk ∈ (1, σTk ]: in (a), θmax ∈ [0, θT13k ], s∗k = 3 for θ ∈ [0, θmax]; in (b), θmax ∈ (θT13k ,∞), s∗k = 3 for θ ∈ [0, θT13k ] and s∗k = 1
for θ ∈ (θT13k , θmax]. (c), (d) and (e) show the three optimal strategies in the domain σk ∈ (σTk ,∞): in (c), θmax ∈ [0, θT23k ],
s∗k = 3 for θ ∈ [0, θmax]; in (d), θmax ∈ (θT23k , θT12k ], s∗k = 3 for θ ∈ [0, θT23k ] and s∗k = 2 for θ ∈ (θT23k , θmax]; in (e),
θmax ∈ (θT12k ,∞), s∗k = 3 for θ ∈ [0, θT23k ], s∗k = 2 for θ ∈ (θT23k , θT12k ] and s∗k = 1 for θ ∈ (θT12k , θmax]..
In order to guarantee that the feasible domain of each video watching strategy (i.e., sk =
1, 2, 3) is non-empty, without loss of generality, we only consider the case such that σk ∈ (σTk ,∞)
and θmax ∈ (θT12k ,∞), as shown in Fig. 3(e). The analysis of case in Fig. 3(e) can be applied in
all other cases.
3) Watching Strategy Probability: Note that θ follows the uniform distribution over [0, θmax],
therefore, under pk and coefficient σk, the probability that a mobile user chooses to be VIP-
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Member, Regular-Member and Non-Member of website k can be respectively given by:
χVk (pk) =
θmax − θT12k
θmax
= 1− (σk − 1)pk
(QVk −QRk )θmax
. (13)
χRk (pk) =
θT12k − θT23k
θmax
=
pk
[
σk(Q
R
k −QNk )− (QVk −QNk )
]
(QVk −QRk )(QRk −QNk )θmax
. (14)
χNk (pk) =
θT23k
θmax
=
pk
(QRk −QNk )θmax
. (15)
B. Stage II: Video Websites’ Optimal Membership Pricing p∗ and Optimal Selling Number of
AD Spaces M ∗
In this subsection, we consider the video Websites’ optimal membership pricing strategies
p∗ , {p∗1, p∗2, · · · , p∗K} for mobile users and the optimal selling number of AD spaces M ∗ ,
{M∗1 ,M∗2 , · · · ,M∗K} for advertiser in stage II. Each video website k(∈ K) decides its optimal
member pricing p∗k by anticipating the mobile user’s watching strategy in stage III, and makes its
decision on optimal selling number of AD space M∗k not only by responding to the advertising
budget in stage I, but also depending on the AD spaces selling strategies of other websites M ∗−k.
1) Optimal membership pricing p∗k: Substituting (13) and (14) into (3), the optimization
problem of maximizing the utility of video website k in terms of mobile users’ payments for
membership can be formulated as:
max
pk
V Mk (pk) = max
pk
φkN
(
σkpkχ
V
k (pk) + pkχ
R
k (pk)
)
= max
pk
φkN
[
σkpk − p2k
(σk − 1)2(QRk −QNk ) + (QVk −QRk )
θmax(QVk −QRk )(QRk −QNk )
]
. (16)
s.t.
 pk ≥ 0.θT12k (pk) ≤ θmax. k ∈ K. (17)
where the first constraint in (17) means the membership price is non-negative, and the second
constraint in (17) means the preference factor threshold θT12k (pk) should no larger than θmax
to guarantee non-empty feasible domain of each mobile user’s video watching strategy (i.e.,
sk = 1, 2, 3).
Theorem 1. The unique optimal membership price of video website k, i.e., p∗k, for problem in
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(16) is given by:
p∗k =
[
σkθmax(Q
V
k −QRk )(QRk −QNk )
2 [(σk − 1)2(QRk −QNk ) + (QVk −QRk )]
] θmax(QVk −QRk )
(σk−1)
(18)
where [a]b , min{a, b}.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
2) Optimal Selling Number of AD Spaces M ∗: In this part, we will determine the optimal
selling number of AD spaces M ∗ , {M∗1 ,M∗2 , · · · ,M∗K}. From the utility function of each
video website k in (4), we can see that the optimal selling number of the AD spaces of website
k, i.e., M∗k , not only depends on the total advertising budget Pa, but also depends on the AD
spaces selling strategies of other websites, i.e., M ∗−k. Therefore, the process of determining the
optimal M∗k for each website is the non-cooperative game, and the utility maximizing problem
of each website k in terms of selling AD spaces can be formulated as follows:
max
Mk
V Ak (Mk,M−k, Pa) = max
Mk
Mk∑K
j=1Mj
Pa − CkMk (19)
s.t. Mk ≥ 0. (20)
for k ∈ K. The first term in (19), i.e., Mk∑K
j=1 Mj
Pa, represents the reward of video website k, and
the second term in (19), i.e., CkMk, means the corresponding total ADs maintenance cost. The
constraint in (20) indicates that the selling number of AD spaces for each video website k is
non-negative.
Assumption: we consider the case
∑
j∈K\{k}Mj = 0, i.e., all other websites except web-
site k don’t participate in the advertising budget game, then, the utility in (4) is reduced to
V Ak (Mk,M−k, Pa) = Pa − CkMk. In this case, there exists no optimal solution (equilibrium)
for problem in (19) since the utility V Ak (Mk,M−k, Pa) can be infinitely tending to Pa when we
choose a sufficiently small positive Mk. Therefore, we here assume that
∑
j∈K\{k}Mj > 0 in
this paper.
We note that the objective function in problem (19) is concave since ∂
2V Ak (Mk,M−k,Pa)
∂M2k
=
−2
∑
j∈K\{k}Mj
(
∑
j∈KMj)
3 Pa < 0 holds, and the constraint in (20) is linear. Therefore, the problem in
(19) is convex, and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are the necessary and sufficient
conditions of optimality [45]. We thus derive the KKT conditions of problem in (19) as follows:
we let βk, k ∈ K, denote the the lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint in (20). The
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Lagrangian function of problem (19) with nonnegative βk, k ∈ K, can be given by:
L(Mk,M−k, Pa, βk) = Mk∑K
j=1 Mj
Pa − CkMk + βkMk. (21)
Denote β∗k as the optimal the optimal Lagrange multiplier for the corresponding dual problem.
Therefore, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [45] are given by:
∂L
∂M∗k
=
∑
j∈K\{k}M
∗
j(∑
j∈KM
∗
j
)2Pa − Ck + β∗k = 0, k ∈ K. (22)
Moreover, the non-negative Lagrange multiplier, i.e., β∗k ≥ 0, should satisfy the the complemen-
tary slackness conditions [45]:
β∗kM
∗
k = 0, k ∈ K.. (23)
Combining (22)-(23) and simplifying, we have
M∗k (M
∗
−k, Pa) =
√Pa∑j∈K\{k}M∗j
Ck
−
∑
j∈K\{k}
M∗j
+ (24)
for k ∈ K, where [x]+ , max{0, x}.
We can see from (24) that: if
∑
j∈K\{k}M
∗
j <
Pa
Ck
, we have M∗k (M
∗
−k, Pa) > 0; else if∑
j∈K\{k}M
∗
j ≥ PaCk , we have M∗k (M ∗−k, Pa) = 0. Thus, we can further divide the optimal
selling number of AD spaces M ∗ into two subsets. Specifically, one is the subset where the
optimal strategy of each video website is participating in the advertising budget game, in other
words, the optimal selling number of AD spaces is positive. We further denote this subset as
K¯ , {k ∈ K|M∗k > 0}, and denote the corresponding size as |K¯|. The other is the subset where
the optimal strategy of each video website is not participating in the advertising budget game,
namely, the optimal selling number of the AD spaces is zero. Similarly, we denote this subset
as K\K¯ , {k ∈ K|M∗k = 0}, and the corresponding size as |K\K¯|.
In addition, we should notice that M∗k stated in (24) is still a function of M
∗
−k under Pa,
and this coupled relationship does not provide the insight about the specific structure of the
optimal solution. Interestingly, we are fortunate to find out that: given subset K¯, we can derive
the closed-form solution of M∗k under Pa, which is rigorously stated in the following Theorem.
Theorem 2. Given subset K¯, the optimal selling number of AD spaces of video website k under
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advertising budget Pa, i.e., M∗k (Pa), for problem in (19) is given by:
M∗k (Pa) =

Pa(|K¯|−1)∑
j∈K¯ Cj
(
1− (|K¯|−1)Ck∑
j∈K¯ Cj
)
, if k ∈ K¯.
0, if k /∈ K¯.
(25)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C.
Note that the advertising budget Pa is given in stage I, thus, it can be considered as a
constant during the determination of M∗k (Pa). From (25), we know that once K¯ is determined,
the optimal solution for problem in (19), i.e., M∗k (Pa), is also obtained. Therefore, our remaining
work is to determine the subset K¯. Before we proceed, we first provide some properties about
K¯ based on the above arguments.
Proposition 1. In the optimal solution for problem in (19), the size of the subset K¯ is no smaller
than 2, i.e., |K¯| ≥ 2.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D.
Combining Theorem 2 and Proposition 1, we then have:
Proposition 2. In the optimal solution for problem in (19), for each video website which belongs
to subset K¯, its maintenance cost of unit AD space Ck satisfies (|K¯| − 1)Ck <
∑
j∈K¯ Cj .
Proof: Please refer to Appendix E.
Proposition 3. In the optimal solution for problem in (19), if ∀k ∈ K such that Ck ≤ maxj∈K¯ Cj ,
then, k ∈ K¯.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix F.
Based on the insight provided by Proposition 1-3, we propose the following algorithm to
compute the optimal subset K¯ for problem in (19).
Algorithm 1 The Optimal Subset K¯ Computation
1: Sort Ck, k ∈ K in ascending order: Cϑ1 ≤ Cϑ2 ≤ · · · ≤ CϑK ;
2: Find ϑk = arg max2≤i≤K{(i− 1)Cϑi <
∑i
j=1Cϑj};
3: Let K¯ , {ϑ1, ϑ2, · · · , ϑk}.
The first step in Algorithm 1 is to sort the unit AD space maintenance cost Ck, k ∈ K,
in ascending order. ϑi, i ∈ K is the mapping index after the sorting operation for Ck, k ∈ K.
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For instance, we let K = 3, and further let C1 = 3, C2 = 2 and C3 = 1, respectively. After the
sorting operation, we have C3 < C2 < C1, and thus ϑ1 = 3, ϑ2 = 2 and ϑ3 = 1. In addition,
Proposition 3 indicates the structure of the optimal subset K¯, that is, each video website with
the unit AD space cost no larger than the cost threshold is the element of the optimal subset K¯,
while the rest video websites belong to the subset K\K¯, where the cost threshold is the maximal
unit AD space cost satisfying the condition in proposition 2 for the ascending order AD space
cost sequence, i.e., {Cϑ1 , Cϑ2 , · · · , CϑK} in step 1. Moreover, since |K¯| ≥ 2 by Proposition 1,
it is natural that the index of video website with the maximal unit AD space cost (denoted by
ϑk) is an integer in [ϑ2, ϑK ]. Therefore, through step 2, we can find the maximal cost index ϑk,
and thus the optimal subset is K¯ , {ϑ1, ϑ2, · · · , ϑk}.
C. Stage III: The optimal advertising Budget P ∗a
In this subsection, we study the optimal advertising budget P ∗a in stage I. The advertiser
determines its strategy through anticipating each video website’s optimal AD space selling
strategy M∗k and the optimal membership pricing strategy p
∗
k, in stage II, as well as the mobile
user’s optimal Non-Member watching strategy probability χNk (p
∗
k) in stage III. In addition, since
only those video websites belong to subset K¯ participate in the game in stage I, it is natural to
reformulate the utility function of the advertiser in (9) as:
V AD(Pa) =
∑
k∈K¯
ωkGφkNχ
N
k (p
∗
k)τk(Pa, p
∗
k,M
∗
k )− Pa (26)
where p∗k and M
∗
k are respectively computed in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, the optimal subset
K¯ is determined in Algorithm 1.
1) AD Spaces Saturation: We can learn form Theorem 2 that M∗k increases linearly in Pa
for k ∈ K¯. Therefore, the domain of Pa, i.e., [0,+∞), implies the domain of M∗k (Pa) is also
[0,+∞). Meanwhile, we should notice that the average total visiting number of website k’s
advertising-containing videos per unit period is ξφkNχNk (p
∗
k), which indicates that: if M
∗
k (Pa) ∈
[0, ξφkNχ
N
k (p
∗
k)), the specific advertisement’s watching probability ϕk(Pa, p
∗
k,M
∗
k ) can be calcu-
lated by (6); if M∗k (Pa) ∈ [ξφkNχNk (p∗k),+∞), the specific advertisement’s watching probability
in (6) is replaced by ϕk(Pa, p∗k,M
∗
k ) =
1
G
. This is because the effective total advertisement watch-
ing number is saturated when M∗k (Pa) ≥ ξφkNχNk (p∗k) due to the constraint of the average total
visiting number, i.e., ξφkNχNk (p
∗
k). Thus, when M
∗
k (Pa) ≥ ξφkNχNk (p∗k), ϕk(Pa, p∗k,M∗k ) reaches
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its maximum 1
G
and increasing AD spaces M∗k cannot contribute for increasing ϕk(Pa, p
∗
k,M
∗
k )
anymore. In the rest of this paper, if there exists M∗k (Pa) ≥ ξφkNχNk (p∗k), k ∈ K¯, we then call
website k’s AD spaces are saturated. Based on the above arguments, we can naturally updated
the AD Watching Probability in (8) as (27).
τ¯k(Pa, p
∗
k,M
∗
k ) =
{
1− exp
(
− M∗k (Pa)
GφkNχ
N
k (p
∗
k)
)
, if M∗k (Pa) < ξφkNχ
N
k (p
∗
k);
1− exp(− ξ
G
), if M∗k (Pa) ≥ ξφkNχNk (p∗k).
k ∈ K¯. (27)
The advertiser’s utility maximization problem can thus be formulated as follows:
max
Pa
V AD(Pa) = max
Pa
∑
k∈K¯
ωkGφkNχ
N
k (p
∗
k)τ¯k(Pa, p
∗
k,M
∗
k )− Pa (28)
s.t. Pa ≥ 0. (29)
2) Advertising Budget Saturation Threshold: Before we proceed, we first provide a def-
inition about the corresponding advertising budget threshold value Pa when the website’s AD
spaces are saturated.
Definition 4. We define P T,ka = Pa as the advertising budget saturation threshold of video
website k, k ∈ K¯, if M∗k (Pa) = ξφkNχNk (p∗k), i.e., video website k’s AD spaces are saturated.
Note that there are |K¯| video websites in subset K¯, thus, there exists total |K¯| advertising
budget saturation thresholds. We further denote P T,maxa , max{P T,1a , P T,2a , · · · , P T,|K¯|a } as the
maximum advertising budget saturation threshold, and denote P T,mina , min{P T,1a , P T,2a , · · · , P T,|K¯|a }
as the minimum advertising budget saturation threshold, respectively. We sort these |K¯| advertis-
ing budget saturation threshold values in ascending order, and denote it by {P T,α1a , P T,α2a , · · · , P
T,α|K¯|
a },
where αk, k ∈ K¯, is the mapping index after sorting operation. Naturally, we have P T,mina =
P T,α1a ≤ P T,α2a ≤ · · · ≤ P
T,α|K¯|
a = P T,maxa . Moreover, if Pa = P
T,αk
a , then, the AD spaces of all
the websites in set {α1, · · · , αk} are saturated.
3) The optimal advertising Budget P ∗a : Based on the above argument, we can have the
following lemma which describes the upper bound of P ∗a for problem in (28).
Lemma 2. The optimal solution of problem in (28) P ∗a satisfies P ∗a ≤ P T,maxa .
Proof: Please refer to Appendix G
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V AD(Pa) =

∑
k∈K¯
ωαkGφαkNχ
N
αk
(p∗αk)ταk(Pa, p
∗
αk
,M∗αk)− Pa,
0 ≤ Pa ≤ P T,mina ;
|K¯|∑
k=2
ωαkGφαkNχ
N
αk
(p∗αk)ταk(Pa, p
∗
αk
,M∗αk) + ωα1Gφα1Nχ
N
α1
(p∗α1)(1− exp(− ξG))− Pa,
P T,mina ≤ Pa ≤ P T,α2a ;
...
ωα|K¯|Gφα|K¯|Nχ
N
α|K¯|(p
∗
α|K¯|)τα|K¯|(Pa, p
∗
α|K¯| ,M
∗
α|K¯|) +
|K¯|−1∑
k=1
ωαkGφαkNχ
N
αk
(p∗αk)(1− exp(− ξG))− Pa,
P
T,α|K¯|−1
a ≤ Pa ≤ P T,maxa .
(30)
Combining the advertising budget saturation threshold and Lemma 2, we can equivalently
reformulate the objective function in (28) as in (30). It is not difficult to find: 1) function
V AD(Pa) in (30) is with piecewise structure; and 2) function V AD(Pa) in (30) is continuous
since we can verified that each utility function in (30) is continuous in its own feasible do-
main, and V AD(P T,αk−a ) = V
AD(P T,αka ) = V
AD(P T,αk+a ), k ∈ K¯, by (27) and (30), where
x− = lim→0+ x −  and x+ = lim→0+ x + . Therefore, to determine the optimal solution of
problem in (28) is equivalent to find out a specific Pa in one of |K¯| feasible domains (i.e.,
[0, P T,mina ], · · · , [P
T,α|K¯|−1
a , P T,maxa ]) to maximize its corresponding objective function in (30),
meanwhile, the corresponding objective function value is larger than the maximum value of any
other objective function in (30) in its own feasible domain.
The remaining work is to determine the specific expression form of the objective function in
(30), and to calculate its optimal solution of its corresponding objective function maximization
problem within the feasible domain. Before we proceed, we first define S as the set of those
websites such that their AD spaces are saturated. In addition, the |K¯| advertising budget satura-
tion thresholds’ relationship, i.e., P T,mina = P
T,α1
a ≤ P T,α2a ≤ · · · ≤ P
T,α|K¯|
a = P T,maxa , determines
that the set S can only be one element of S¯ , {∅, {1}, {1, 2}, · · · , {1, 2, · · · , |K¯−1|}}, where S¯
denotes the feasible domain of set S. For notation simplification, we respectively define S¯0 , ∅
and S¯k , {1, · · · , k}, where k ∈ {1, · · · , |K¯ − 1|}. Therefore, S¯ , {S¯0, S¯1, · · · , S¯|K¯|−1}. Then,
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for any S ∈ S¯, we consider an optimization problem:
max
Pa
F (Pa) = max
Pa
∑
k∈S
ωαkGφαkNχ
N
αk
(p∗αk)
(
1− exp
(
− ξ
G
))
+
∑
k∈K¯\S
ωαkGφαkNχ
N
αk
(p∗αk)ταk(Pa, p
∗
αk
,M∗αk)− Pa. (31)
s.t. Pa ≥ 0. (32)
Problem in (31) can be considered as the problem in (28) under given set S with the feasible
domain relaxing to [0,+∞). Specifically, no matter S equals to any element in S¯, the objective
function in (31) is the same as the corresponding objective function in (30), and the only
difference between these two problems are the feasible domains. For instance, we assume
S = S¯1 = {1}, the feasible domain of problem in (31) is [0,+∞), while the feasible domain of
problem in (28) is (P T,α1a , P
T,α2
a ].
Next, we will give a lemma which characterizes the relationship among different optimal
solutions for problem in (31) under different set S .
Lemma 3. For S,S ′ ∈ S¯, if S ⊆ S ′, then, the optimal solution for problem in (31) satisfies
P ∗a,S ≥ P ∗a,S′ , where P ∗a,S and P ∗a,S′ are the optimal solution corresponds to S and S ′, respectively.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix H.
Based on the above arguments, we will propose the algorithm to calculate the optimal
solution P ∗a for problem in (28), the rigorous description is stated as follows:
Algorithm 2 The Optimal Advertising Budget P ∗a Computation
1: Let S = S¯0 = ∅ and compute the corresponding optimal solution P ∗a,S=S¯0 for problem in
(31).
2: If P ∗
a,S=S¯0 ≤ P T,mina , then, P ∗a = P ∗a,S=S¯0; else, goto step 3.
3: Let S = S¯k for all k ∈ {1, · · · , |K¯ − 1|}, and compute the corresponding optimal solution
P ∗
a,S=S¯k for problem in (31).
4: Find out k∗ = arg maxk∈{1,··· ,|K¯−1|} P ∗a,S=S¯k ≥ P T,αka . If k∗ exists, P ∗a =
min{P ∗
a,S=S¯k∗ , P
T,αk∗+1
a }; else, P ∗a = P T,mina .
The key of this algorithm is to 1) solve the optimal solution P ∗a,S , S ∈ S¯, for problem
in (31), and 2) to determine the relationship between P ∗a,S and the corresponding objective
function’s feasible domain in (30). In specific, we first let S = S¯0 = ∅, and obtain P ∗a,S by
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(49). If P ∗
a,S=S¯0 ≤ P T,mina = P T,α1a , then, Problem in (31) and problem in (28) is equivalent,
thus P ∗a = P
∗
a,S=S¯0; else, there exists at least one video website such that the AD spaces are
saturated and the optimal advertising budget P ∗a satisfies P
∗
a ≥ P T,mina due to the concavity and
continuity of V AD(Pa) in (30). Specifically, if there does not exists an index k∗ ∈ {1, · · · , |K¯ −
1|}, i.e., P ∗
a,S=S¯0 ≥ P T,mina > P ∗a,S=S¯1 ≥ · · · ≥ P ∗a,S=S¯|K¯−1| , in this case, according to the
concavity of V AD(Pa) in (30), V AD(0 < Pa ≤ P T,mina ) achieves its maximum value at P T,mina
and V AD(P T,αka ≤ Pa < P T,αk+1a ), k ∈ {1, · · · , |K¯ − 1|} achieves its maximum value at P T,αka .
Since V AD(Pa) in (30) is continuous, we have P ∗a = P
T,min
a . If the index k
∗ exists, according to
lemma 3, it can guarantee that P ∗
a,S=S¯k ≥ P T,αka for αk ≤ αk∗ and P ∗a,S=S¯k < P T,αka for αk > αk∗ .
similar to the above analysis, we have P ∗a = min{P ∗a,S=S¯k∗ , P
T,αk∗+1
a }.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 2 can find the optimal Advertising Budget P ∗a for Problem in (28).
Proof: Please refer to Appendix I.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide the numerical results to verify the impacts of the varies of
different parameters’ values on V AD, V VWk , P
∗
a , p
∗
k, M
∗
k and the key indicators.
A. The impact of different mean values of σk
In this subsection, we show the impact of the VIP-Member price coefficient σk on the
membership probability (i.e., χVk , χ
R
k and χ
N
k ), the optimal membership price (i.e., p
∗
k and σkp
∗
k),
the optimal advertising budget (i.e., P ∗a ) and all utilities (i.e., V
M∗
k , V
A∗
k , V
VW ∗
k and V
AD∗). We
choose K = 10, θmax = 1, QVk = 40, Q
R
k = 20, Q
N
k = 10, Ck = k, k = {1, 2, · · · , K}, ξ = 10,
γ = 0.5, N = 5000, G = 5 and ωk = 100. In addition, we let the mean of σk vary from 3 to
150, i.e., σk ∈ [σTk , 50σTk ].
Fig. 4 presents the impacts of different mean values of σk on the optimal Regular-Member
price p∗k, the optimal VIP-Member price σkp
∗
k and the optimal advertising budget P
∗
a , respectively.
We can see that both Regular-Member price and VIP-Member price are decreasing in σk.
In addition, when σk is sufficiently large, we have lim
σk→∞
p∗k = lim
σk→∞
θmax(QVk −QRk )
2(σk−1) = 0 and
lim
σk→∞
σkp
∗
k =
θmax(QVk −QRk )
2
= 10, which also explain that Regular-Member price and VIP-Member
price respectively converge to 0 and 10 when σk approaches to 150. In addition, we also find
P ∗a is decreasing in the mean values of σk.
23
Fig. 5 shows the membership probability of mobile user under different mean values of
σk. It can be easily observed that χVk first decreases and then increases in σk, χ
R
k increases in
σk and χNk decreases in σk. Moreover, when σk = σ
T
k = 3, p
∗
k in (18) can be simplified as
p∗k = θmax(Q
R
k − QNk )/2, and thus we have θT12k = θT23k = θT13k = θmax/2 = 1/2 by substituting
p∗k = θmax(Q
R
k − QNk )/2 into definition 1-3. According to (13)-(15), we have χVk = χNk =
1/2 and χRk = 0, that is to say, each mobile user’s strategy is to be Non-Member or VIP-
Member of website k, which is in accordance with the case in (11). When σk is sufficiently
large, i.e., σk → ∞, we have lim
σk→∞
p∗k = lim
σk→∞
θmax(QVk −QRk )
2(σk−1) = 0, limσk→∞
θT12k =
1
2
, lim
σk→∞
θT23k =
lim
σk→∞
(QVk −QRk )
2(σk−1)(QRk −QNk )
= 0, and further lim
σk→∞
χRk = lim
σk→∞
χVk =
1
2
, lim
σk→∞
χNk = 0. Therefore, when
σk approaches to 150, χVk and χ
R
k converge to
1
2
, and χNk converges to 0, respectively. In other
words, each mobile user’s strategy is to be VIP-Member or Regular-Member of website k.
Fig. 6 illustrates the impacts of different mean values of σk on the membership utility (V M
∗
k ),
the AD space utility (V A∗k ), the video website’s utility (V
VW ∗
k ) and the advertiser’s utility (V
AD∗),
respectively. Here, we let σk ∈ [3, 30]. Firstly, we can observe that V Mk is decreasing in σk. This
is because although we can observe from Fig.5 that χVk and χ
R
k are increasing in σk, both p
∗
k and
σkp
∗
k are decreasing in σk from Fig. 4 and the influences of them on V
M∗
k are dominant, thus,
V M
∗
k is decreasing in σk by (3). Secondly, substituting (25) and (43) into (4) and simplifying, we
have V A∗k = P
∗
a
(
1− (|K¯|−1)Ck∑
j∈K¯ Cj
)2
, which implies that V A∗k is decreasing in σk since P
∗
a decreases
in σk from Fig.4. Thirdly, it is nature that V VW
∗
k decreases in σk since V
VW
k = V
M
k + V
A
k .
Fourthly, we can find that V AD
∗
is decreasing in σk. This is because χNk decreases in σk from
Fig.4, and the impact of
∑
k∈K¯ ωkGφkNχ
N
k (p
∗
k)τ¯k(Pa, p
∗
k,M
∗
k ) in (28) is dominant, thus, V
AD
decreases in σk.
In addition, since the utilities of the video website and the advertiser, i.e., V VW
∗
k and V
AD∗ ,
are decreasing in σk from Fig.6, we can conclude that the increase of σk is not beneficial to
improve the utilities of the video website and the advertiser.
B. The impact of different γ
In this section, we demonstrate the impact of video website’s popularity concentrate level
parameter γ on the optimal adverting budget (i.e., P ∗a ), the optimal AD spaces selling number
(i.e., M∗k ), and each utility (i.e., V
M
k , V
A
k , V
VW
k and V
AD), respectively. Here, we let σk = 1.25σTk ,
γ ∈ [0, 1]. We respectively consider two AD cost parameter settings: Ck = k and Ck = K−k+1,
where k = {1, 2, · · · , K}. The remaining parameter settings are the same as section IV-A.
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Fig. 4. The impacts of different mean values of σk on the membership price and the advertising budget.
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Fig.7 depicts the impact of γ on V M∗k and P
∗
a . Since parameter γ describes the concen-
tration level of the video website’s popularity distribution, with increasing of γ, the popularity
concentrates on the high-ranking video websites (i.e., the websites with small index number). In
other words, the popularity of high-ranking video website increases in γ, and the popularity of
low-ranking video website decreases in γ. According to (3), we know that the monotonicity of
V Mk is the same with that of φk. Meanwhile, we can see from the left sub-fig in Fig. 7 that only
φ1 (or V M
∗
1 ) and φ2 (or V
M∗
2 ) increase in γ; φ3 (or V
M∗
3 ) first increases and then decreases in
γ; φk (or V M
∗
k ), k = 3, · · · , K decreases in γ.
In addition, we note that the subset K¯ only depends on the AD cost Ck in K. According
to those two AD cost settings in the experiment, we have K¯ equal to {1, 2} for case Ck = k
and {9, 10} for case Ck = K − k + 1, respectively. Meanwhile, based on the results of the left
sub-fig in Fig. 7, we know that φk, k ∈ {1, 2} increases in γ and we can say that the websites
participating in the game are with high-ranking popularity. For K¯ = {9, 10}, φk, k ∈ K¯ decreases
in γ and we can say that the websites participating in the game are with low-ranking popularity.
Therefore, for k ∈ {1, 2}, Bk = GφkNχNk (p∗k) is increasing in γ, and further P ∗a is increasing
in γ by (51), which is shown in the right sub-fig of Fig. 7. For k ∈ {9, 10}, through the similar
analysis to the case k ∈ {1, 2}, P ∗a is decreasing in γ, as shown in the dashed line of Fig. 7.
Fig.8 shows the impact of γ on M∗k and V
A∗
k . For k ∈ {1, 2}, since P ∗a is increasing in γ
from Fig.7, we can know that M∗1 and M
∗
2 are also increasing in γ by (25), as shown in the left
sub-fig in Fig.8. Meanwhile, similar to the analysis of Fig.7, since V Ak = Pa
(
1− (|K¯|−1)Ck∑
j∈K¯ Cj
)2
,
V A
∗
1 and V
A∗
2 increase in γ, as shown in the right sub-fig in Fig.8. For k ∈ {9, 10}, we can see
that M∗9 , M
∗
10, V
A∗
9 and V
A∗
10 are decreasing in γ, as shown in the dashed lines.
Fig.9 illustrates the impact of γ on V VW
∗
k and V
AD∗ . For k ∈ {1, 2}, V VW ∗1 and V VW ∗2 is
increasing in γ since V VWk = V
M
k + V
A
k . Meanwhile, since φ1 and φ2 increase in γ, and the
impact of
∑
k∈K¯ ωkGφkNχ
N
k (p
∗
k)τ¯k(Pa, p
∗
k,M
∗
k ) in (28) is dominant, thus, V
AD∗ increases in γ.
For k ∈ {9, 10}, V VW ∗9 , V VW ∗10 and V AD∗ are decreasing in γ, as shown in the dashed lines.
In addition, we can conclude from Fig.9 that the impact of γ on V VW
∗
k and V
AD∗ depends
on the popularity of the websites that participate the AD spaces game: if the websites are with
high-ranking popularity, both V VW
∗
k and V
AD∗ are increasing in γ; else, both V VW
∗
k and V
AD∗
are decreasing in γ.
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C. The impact of AD space maintenance cost: Ck
In this section, we will verify the impacts of Ck on each key indicator and utility. We first
let σk = 1.25σTk , γ = 0.5 and C1 = · · · = C10 ∈ [1, 2, · · · , 10]. The remaining parameter settings
are the same as section IV-A.
Fig.10 presents the impact of Ck on |K¯|, mean M∗k , mean CkM∗k and P ∗a . Firstly, since all
the AD space maintenance costs are equal in the setting, all the websites satisfy the conditions
in Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, all of them participate in the advertising budget game, i.e.,
|K¯| = 10, as shown in the first sub-fig in Fig. 10. Then, we can also observe that M∗k decreases
in Ck. This is because when Ck increases, Ak =
(|K¯|−1)∑
j∈K¯ Cj
(
1− (|K¯|−1)Ck∑
j∈K¯ Cj
)
decreases, we know
that exp
(
−AkP ∗a
Bk
)
increases by (51), thus M∗k = P
∗
aAk decreases. Next, since the growth rate of
Ck, i.e., 9, is larger than the decrement rate of mean M∗k , i.e., -0.5, therefore, the average total
AD cost CkM∗k is increasing in Ck. Lastly, we find that P
∗
a is increasing in Ck. This is due to
the fact that the decrement rate of mean M∗k , i.e., -0.5, is less than that of Ak, i.e., -0.9, and the
fact M∗k = P
∗
aAk, thus, P
∗
a must be an increasing function of Ck.
Fig.11 shows the impact of Ck on each utility. First, since the member utility V Mk is
independent of Ck, V M
∗
k keeps the same when Ck varies from 1 to 10. In addition, since
P ∗a is increasing in Ck from Fig.10, by the derived formula V
A∗
k = P
∗
a
(
1− (|K¯|−1)Ck∑
j∈K¯ Cj
)2
, we
know that V A∗k is increasing in Ck. Furthermore, we can see that V
VW ∗
k is increasing in Ck
according to the formula V VWk = V
M
k + V
A
k and the monotonicity of V
M∗
k and V
A∗
k . Lastly,
V AD
∗
k is decreasing in Ck. This is because with the increase in Ck, the increase in mean M
∗
k
(from Fig.10) leads to the decrease in τk(Pa, p∗k,M
∗
k ), and further leads to the decrease in∑
k∈K¯ ωkGφkNχ
N
k (p
∗
k)τ¯k(Pa, p
∗
k,M
∗
k ) in (28). Meanwhile, we know that P
∗
a is increasing in
Ck from Fig.10. Therefore, V AD
∗
k is decreasing in Ck.
Next, we let Ck follow the uniform distribution over [1, Cmax], where Cmax varies from 1
to 10 with unit increment. The other parameter settings are kept the same. Fig. 12 illustrates
the impact of Cmax on the number of video websites participating in the advertising budget
game, i.e., |K¯|. It can be easily observed that |K¯| decreases in Cmax. This is because when Cmax
increases, the AD costs of all video website become diverse, which increases the possibility of
violating the conditions in Proposition 2 and Proposition 3.
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D. The impact of visiting frequency ξ
Fig.13 illustrates the impact of visiting frequency ξ on the utilities of video website and
advertiser, i.e., V VW
∗
k and V
AD∗ , respectively. We choose σk = 1.25σTk , γ = 0.5, Ck = k and
let ξ vary from 1 to 40 with increment of 1. The remaining parameter settings are the same as
section IV-A. We can see that both V VW
∗
k and V
AD∗ increase in ξ when ξ ∈ [0, 20], and keep the
same when ξ ∈ [21, 40]. The reason is that when ξ ∈ [0, 20], There exists at least one AD spaces
saturated website, in this case, P ∗a is an increasing function of ξ, thus, V
VW ∗
k is increasing in ξ
due to V VWk = V
M
k + V
A
k , where V
A∗
k is increasing in P
∗
a and V
M∗
k is a constant. Meanwhile,
V AD
∗
increases in P ∗a in this case, and thus increases in ξ. When ξ ∈ [21, 40], there does not
exist any AD spaces saturated website, in this case, both V VW
∗
k and V
AD∗ are independent of
ξ, therefore, both of them are keep the same even increasing the value of ξ.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered a novel economics model of video websites via Membership-
Advertising Mode in wireless network, and analyzed the interactions among the advertiser,
mobile users and video websites through a three-stage Stackelberg game. In addition to study
the equilibrium of each sub-game, we also investigated the impacts of different VIP-Member
price coefficient values on the mobile users’s watching strategies. We observed that the optimal
subset of video websites participating in the advertising budget game only depended on the
advertising space maintenance cost rather than the advertising budget, and further find out the
30
subset through exploiting the special structure of those cost. Furthermore, the numerical results
revealed the following insights: 1) The utility of video website (advertiser) is decreasing in the
VIP-Member price coefficient; 2) If the video websites that participate in the advertising budget
game are with high-ranking popularity, then, the utility of video website (advertiser) is increasing
in concentration level, else, the utility is decreasing in concentration level. 3) The utility of video
website (advertiser) is increasing (decreasing) in the advertising space maintenance cost, and the
number of video websites that participate in the advertising budget game is decreasing if the
costs become diverse. 4) If there exists AD spaces saturated video website (or visiting frequency
is small), the utility of video website (advertiser) is increasing in visiting frequency, if there does
not exist any AD spaces saturated video website (visiting frequency is sufficiently large), the
utility of video website (advertiser) is independent of visiting frequency.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
First, we let (σk−1)pk
QVk −QRk
= σkpk
QVk −QNk
, we have σk =
QVk −QNk
QRk −QNk
. We then let (σk−1)pk
QVk −QRk
= pk
QRk −QNk
, and
we also have σk =
QVk −QNk
QRk −QNk
. Therefore, when (σk−1)pk
QVk −QRk
= σkpk
QVk −QNk
= pk
QRk −QNk
, the price coefficient
satisfies σk =
QVk −QNk
QRk −QNk
. Since QVk > Q
R
k > Q
N
k > 0, then we have
QVk −QNk
QRk −QNk
=
QVk −QRk +QRk −QNk
QRk −QNk
=
QVk −QRk
QRk −QNk
+ 1 > 1. (33)
We denote σTk ,
QVk −QNk
QRk −QNk
as the price coefficient threshold for website k. Note that σk ∈ (1,∞),
we know from (33) that σTk satisfies the requirement of the feasible domain.
We respectively take the first-order derivation of (σk−1)pk
QVk −QRk
, σkpk
QVk −QNk
and pk
QRk −QNk
with respect
to σk, i.e.,
∂
(
(σk−1)pk
QVk −QRk
)
∂σk
=
pk
QVk −QRk
, (34)
∂
(
σkpk
QVk −QNk
)
∂σk
=
pk
QVk −QNk
, (35)
∂
(
pk
QRk −QNk
)
∂σk
= 0. (36)
Since QVk −QNk > QVk −QRk > 0, we have pkQVk −QRk >
pk
QVk −QNk
> 0. Note that (σk−1)pk
QVk −QRk
= σkpk
QVk −QNk
=
pk
QRk −QNk
at σk = σTk , thus, when 1 < σk ≤ σTk , we have (σk−1)pkQVk −QRk ≤
σkpk
QVk −QNk
≤ pk
QRk −QNk
; when
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σk > σ
T
k , we have
(σk−1)pk
QVk −QRk
> σkpk
QVk −QNk
> pk
QRk −QNk
.
The proof of Lemma 1 is completed. 
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We respectively take the first-order and second-order derivation of V Mk (pk) with respect to
pk, i.e.,
∂V Mk (pk)
∂pk
= σk − 2pk (σk − 1)
2(QRk −QNk ) + (QVk −QRk )
θmax(QVk −QRk )(QRk −QNk )
(37)
∂2V Mk (pk)
∂p2k
= −2(σk − 1)
2(QRk −QNk ) + (QVk −QRk )
θmax(QVk −QRk )(QRk −QNk )
(38)
Meanwhile, the constraint θT12k (pk) ≤ θmax can be rewritten as pk ≤ θmax(Q
V
k −QRk )
(σk−1) . Since
∂2VMk (pk)
∂p2k
<
0, there exists unique optimal solution for the problem (16) in the feasible domain pk ∈
[0,
θmax(QVk −QRk )
(σk−1) ]. We let
∂VMk (pk)
∂pk
= 0, then, we have
p∗k =
[
σkθmax(Q
V
k −QRk )(QRk −QNk )
2 [(σk − 1)2(QRk −QNk ) + (QVk −QRk )]
] θmax(QVk −QRk )
(σk−1)
(39)
for k ∈ K.
Thus, the proof of Theorem 1 is completed. 
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
First, we should note that
∑
j∈K¯Mj =
∑
j∈KMj , for website k, (22) can be rewritten as:
∂L
∂M∗k
=
∑
j∈K\{k}M
∗
j(∑
j∈KM
∗
j
)2Pa − Ck + β∗k =
∑
j∈K¯\{k}M
∗
j(∑
j∈K¯M
∗
j
)2Pa − Ck + β∗k . (40)
Letting ∂L
∂M∗k
= 0, we have ∑
j∈K¯\{k}M
∗
j(∑
j∈K¯M
∗
j
)2Pa − Ck + β∗k = 0. (41)
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Since β∗k = 0 for k ∈ K¯ by (23), we then sum up (41) over all the element in set K¯, i.e.,
∑
j∈K¯
∑j∈K¯\{k}M∗j(∑
j∈K¯M
∗
j
)2Pa − Ck
 = ∑j∈K¯∑j∈K¯\{k}M∗j(∑
j∈K¯M
∗
j
)2 Pa −∑
j∈K¯
Ck =
(|K¯| − 1)(∑
j∈K¯M
∗
j
)Pa −∑
j∈K¯
Ck = 0
(42)
Therefore, from (42), we have ∑
j∈K¯
M∗j =
(|K¯| − 1)Pa∑
j∈K¯ Cj
. (43)
Substituting (43) into (41), we have∑
j∈K¯\{k}
M∗j =
(|K¯| − 1)2PaCk
(
∑
j∈K¯ Cj)
2
. (44)
Letting M∗k (Pa) = 0 for k /∈ K¯ and substituting (44) into (24), we have
M∗k (Pa) =
Pa(|K¯| − 1)∑
j∈K¯ Cj
(
1− (|K¯| − 1)Ck∑
j∈K¯ Cj
)
(45)
for all k ∈ K¯.
Therefore, the proof of Theorem 2 is completed. 
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
According to the assumption of this paper, we know that for any video website k, k ∈ K,
there always exists
∑
j∈K\{k}Mj > 0, which implies that |K¯| ≥ 1 in the optimal solution since
there exists at least a k′(6= k) such that M∗k′ > 0. We further assume that |K¯| = 1, that is to say,
in the optimal solution, M∗k′ > 0 and M
∗
j = 0 for j ∈ K\k′. For video website k′,
∑
j 6=k′Mj = 0,
which contradicts the assumption. Therefore, we have |K¯| ≥ 2 in the optimal solution. 
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Note that |K¯| ≥ 2 in the optimal solution by Proposition 1, the term Pa(|K¯|−1)∑
j∈K¯ Cj
in (25) is
always positive. Therefore, the inequality 1− (|K¯|−1)Ck∑
j∈K¯ Cj
> 0 must be satisfied for k ∈ K¯, i.e., Ck
satisfies (|K¯| − 1)Ck <
∑
j∈K¯ Cj . 
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APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
According to Proposition 2, (|K¯|−1)Ck <
∑
j∈K¯ Cj indicates that (maxj∈K¯ Cj)(|K¯|−1) <∑
j∈K¯ Cj . Assume k /∈ K¯, then, we have [(|K¯|+1)−1]Ck ≥
∑
j∈K¯ Cj+Ck. However, we should
note that Ck ≤ maxj∈K¯ Cj , which implies that:
(|K¯| − 1)Ck ≤ (|K¯| − 1)(max
j∈K¯
Cj) <
∑
j∈K¯
Cj (46)
and
(|K¯| − 1)Ck + Ck <
∑
j∈K¯
Cj + Ck. (47)
Letting K¯′ , K¯ ∪ k, (47) can be rewritten as:
(|K¯′| − 1)Ck <
∑
j∈K¯′
Cj. (48)
which contradicts the assumption. 
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Since when Pa ≥ P T,maxa , the AD Watching Probability τ¯k(Pa, p∗k,M∗k ) = 1− exp(− ξG) for
all k ∈ K¯, thus, the objective function in (28) can be simplified as ∑k∈K¯ ωkGφkNχNk (p∗k)(1−
exp(− ξ
G
)) − Pa. It is easy to find that the left term
∑
k∈K¯ ωkGφkNχ
N
k (p
∗
k)(1 − exp(− ξG)) is a
constant, and thus the objective function is a decreasing function in Pa when Pa ≥ P T,maxa . 
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
we respectively derive the first-order derivative and the second-order derivative of F (Pa)
as follows:
∂F (Pa)
∂Pa
=
∑
k∈K¯\S
ωαkAαk exp
(
−AαkPa
Bαk
)
− 1. (49)
∂2F (Pa)
∂P 2a
=
∑
k∈K¯\S
−ωαk
A2αk
Bαk
exp
(
−AαkPa
Bαk
)
(50)
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where Aαk =
(|K¯|−1)∑
j∈K¯ Cαj
(
1− (|K¯|−1)Cαk∑
j∈K¯ Cαj
)
and Bαk = GφαkNχ
N
αk
(p∗αk). It is obvious that
∂2F (Pa)
∂P 2a
<
0, thus, the objective function F (Pa) is concave and there exists optimal solution in the feasible
domain. For S and S ′, we let the first-order derivative of the objective function equal to zero,
i.e., ∑
k∈K¯\S
ωαkAαk exp
(
−AαkP
∗
a,S
Bαk
)
− 1 = 0 (51)
∑
k∈K¯\S′
ωαkAαk exp
(
−AαkP
∗
a,S′
Bαk
)
− 1 = 0 (52)
Since S ⊆ S ′ ∈ S¯, combining (51) and (52), we have∑
k∈K¯\S
ωαkAαk exp
(
−AαkP
∗
a,S
Bαk
)
=
∑
k∈K¯\S′
ωαkAαk exp
(
−AαkP
∗
a,S
Bαk
)
+
∑
k∈S′−S
ωαkAαk exp
(
−AαkP
∗
a,S
Bαk
)
=
∑
k∈K¯\S′
ωαkAαk exp
(
−AαkP
∗
a,S′
Bαk
)
(53)
Since ωαk , Aαk , Bαk and P
∗
a,S are non-negative,
∑
k∈S′−S ωαkAαk exp
(
−AαkP
∗
a,S
Bαk
)
≥ 0, we have
∑
k∈K¯\S′
ωαkAαk exp
(
−AαkP
∗
a,S
Bαk
)
≤
∑
k∈K¯\S′
ωαkAαk exp
(
−AαkP
∗
a,S′
Bαk
)
. (54)
Meanwhile, since exp
(
−AαkPa
Bαk
)
is decreasing in Pa, we have P ∗a,S ≥ P ∗a,S′ .
The proof of Lemma 3 is completed. 
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
First, we consider the case such that S = S¯0 = ∅ and the corresponding optimal solution for
problem in (31) i.e., P ∗
a,S=S¯0 , satisfies P
∗
a,S=S¯0 < P
T,min
a . In this case, due to the concave nature of∑
k∈S ωαkGφαkNχ
N
αk
(p∗αk)
(
1− exp (− ξ
G
))
+
∑
k∈K¯\S ωαkGφαkNχ
N
αk
(p∗αk)ταk(Pa, p
∗
αk
,M∗αk) −
Pa, where S ∈ S¯. The objective function
∑
k∈K¯ ωαkGφαkNχ
N
αk
(p∗αk)ταk(Pa, p
∗
αk
,M∗αk)− Pa can
reach its maximum value at P ∗
a,S=S¯0 ∈ [0, P T,mina ). Meanwhile, according to lemma 3, we have
the objective function P T,mina ≥ P ∗a,S=S¯0 ≥ P ∗a,S=S¯1 ≥ · · · ≥ P ∗a,S=S¯|K¯|−1 , which implies that∑
k∈S ωαkGφαkNχ
N
αk
(p∗αk)
(
1− exp (− ξ
G
))
+
∑
k∈K¯\S ωαkGφαkNχ
N
αk
(p∗αk)ταk(Pa, p
∗
αk
,M∗αk) −
Pa in (31) is decreasing in domain [P ∗a,S ,+∞), S ∈ S¯, and further implies that V AD(Pa ≥
P T,mina ) in (30) is decreasing with its feasible domain. Therefore, each objective function in
35
(30), i.e., V AD(P T,αka ≤ Pa < P T,αk+1a ), will reach its maximum value at P T,αka , where k ∈
{1, · · · , |K¯|−1}. Meanwhile, since V AD(Pa) is continuous in [0,+∞), we have V AD(P ∗a,S=S¯0) ≥
V AD(P T,α1a ) ≥ · · · ≥ V AD(P
T,α|K¯|
a ). Therefore, we have P ∗a = P
∗
a,S=S¯0 .
Next, we consider the condition that P ∗
a,S=S¯0 < P
T,min
a for problem in (31) can not be sat-
isfied, namely, P ∗
a,S=S¯0 ≥ P T,mina . In this case, we have P ∗a ≥ P T,mina since V AD(Pa) is continuous
in [0,∞), and increasing in [0, P T,mina ]. Specifically, if k∗ exists, k∗ = arg maxk∈{1,··· ,|K¯|−1} P ∗a,S=S¯k ≥ P T,αka
implies that P ∗
a,S=S¯0 ≥ P ∗a,S=S¯1 ≥ · · · ≥ P ∗a,S=S¯k∗ ≥ P T,αk∗a ≥ · · · ≥ P T,mina and P ∗a,S=S¯|K¯|−1 ≤
· · · ≤ P ∗
a,S=S¯k∗+1 ≤ P
T,αk∗+1
a ≤ · · · ≤ P T,α|K¯|−1a . This means that each V AD(Pa) in (30) is increas-
ing in its own feasible domain when Pa ∈
[
0,min{P ∗
a,S=S¯k∗ , P
T,αk∗+1
a }
]
, and decreasing in its
own feasible domain when Pa ∈
[
min{P ∗
a,S=S¯k∗ , P
T,αk∗+1
a }, P T,maxa
]
due to the concave nature of
function
∑
k∈S ωαkGφαkNχ
N
αk
(p∗αk)
(
1− exp (− ξ
G
))
+
∑
k∈K¯\S ωαkGφαkNχ
N
αk
(p∗αk)ταk(Pa, p
∗
αk
,M∗αk)−
Pa, where S ∈ S¯. Similarly, since V AD(Pa) is continuous in [0,∞), k∗ = arg maxk∈{0,··· ,|K¯|−1} P ∗a,S=S¯k ≥ P T,αka
can guarantee that V AD(Pa) is increasing in
[
0,min{P ∗
a,S=S¯k∗ , P
T,αk∗+1
a }
]
, and decreasing in[
min{P ∗
a,S=S¯k∗ , P
T,αk∗+1
a }, P T,maxa
]
. Therefore, P ∗a = min{P ∗a,S=S¯k∗ , P
T,αk∗+1
a }. If k∗ does not
exist, through similar analysis, we have P ∗a = P
T,min
a .
The proof of Theorem 3 is thus completed.
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